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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission
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11 Introduction
Recent research has ensured that market imperfections have a central place
in the transmission of monetary policy through the credit channel. When
there is imperfect information, alternative types of credit cannot be regarded
as perfect substitutes and hence the choice of external ﬁnance on the part
of the ﬁrm, and the availability and price of external funds oﬀered by ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries will depend on factors such as the strength of ﬁrms’
balance sheets. This has introduced the broad credit channel view, exten-
sively surveyed in Gertler (1988), Hubbard (1995) and Kashyap and Stein
(1994). Some ﬁrms with characteristics that prevent eﬀective access to alter-
native markets for funds such as corporate paper or bond markets may be
particularly dependent on bank ﬁnance under these circumstances and this
g i v e sr i s et ot h ebank lending channel.
It has been a characteristic of this literature to think of market ﬁnance
and bank ﬁnance as the two available external ﬁnance options. For example
theoretical research has been developed to allow bank lending and a capital
market to co-exist even though the former is more expensive (see Besanko
and Kanatas (1993), Bolton and Freixas (2000), Diamond (1991), Holm-
strom and Tirole (1997), Repullo and Suarez (2000) and Hoshi, Kashyap
and Scharfstein (1993)). In these papers, capital market imperfections mean
that access is denied to the capital market for ﬁrms with a weak ﬁnancial po-
sition. These models predict that periods of monetary tightening will mostly
aﬀect ﬁnancially weak ﬁrms (usually small ﬁrms) by restricting their access to
bank lending and will cause a proportionate decline in aggregate investment,
which has been corroborated by disaggregated data in Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) and Oliner and Rudebush (1996).
In this paper we consider another important source of external ﬁnance for
ﬁrms, namely trade credit. According to a Federal Reserve Board Study by
Elliehausen and Wolken (1993) trade credit represents about 20% of non-bank
non-farm businesses ’ liabilities, and up to 35% of total assets. A later study
by Rajan and Zingales (1995) calculated that trade credit represented 17.8%
of total assets for all American ﬁrms in 1991. In many other countries, such
as Germany, France and Italy, trade credit represents more than a quarter of
total corporate assets. And in the United Kingdom 70 per cent of total short
term debt (credit extended) and 55 per cent of total credit received by ﬁrms
comprised trade credit (Kohler, Britton and Yates, 2000). Eigthy per cent
of all ﬁrms use trade credit according to a review by Atanasova and Wilson
2(2002), and the scale of trade credit usage is much increased during periods
of monetary contractions.
Meltzer (1960) was the ﬁrst to suggest that a trade credit channel might
be a substitute for the bank lending channel, but from a theoretical point
of view the implications of trade credit for the broad credit channel view
have not yet been explored. Existing theoretical works are mostly concerned
with explaining the use of trade credit. For example, Ferris (1981) and
Schwartz (1974) have suggested that trade credit provides transactions ser-
vices to ﬁrms, and Cunat (2001) demonstrates that, in the context of limited
enforceability of debts, ﬁrms may use both trade credit and bank credit when
the supplier and the buyer engage in speciﬁc production processes. Other
papers have explained why trade credit is extended at all. Jain (2001) argues
that nonﬁnancial ﬁrms extend credit to their customers as intermediaries be-
tween banks and the ultimate buyers. This supports the conjecture of Biais
and Gollier (1997) that the seller’s provision of trade credit can provide a
valuable signal to the banker that the buyer is worthy of credit, thus mit-
igating credit rationing. However, these papers do not explain what the
consequences might be for corporate ﬁnance and monetary policy making if
ﬁrms take up trade credit when other funds are inaccessible and this puts
them at odds with the small empirical literature that attempts to address
this question (cf Nielsen, 2002 and Kohler, Britton and Yates, 2000)
In this paper we tie in a theoretical model with the existing empirical
evidence. In our theoretical model we incorporate trade credit, bank loans
and market funding into a framework that has some similarities with Repullo
and Suarez (2000). Like their model the existence of imperfections on the
credit market means that ﬁrms have access to diﬀerent sources of external
funding according to their initial wealth level (in their case they consider
wealth relative to the size of the investment project). We begin by allowing
ﬁrms access to market ﬁnance and bank ﬁnance only, and ﬁnd with Repullo
and Suarez (2000), that wealthier ﬁrms borrow on the capital market, while
intermediately wealthy ﬁrms get bank loans, and lower wealth ﬁrms fail to
obtain any funding for their projects. When we introduce trade credit, ﬁrms
with little wealth can ﬁnd funding for their projects by accepting trade credit.
Thus instead of a monetary contraction resulting in some ﬁrms being refused
credit altogether as in our ﬁr s tm o d e la n dt h a to fR e p u l l oa n dS u a r e z( 2 0 0 0 ) ,
we ﬁnd monetary tightenings bring about a reduction in total capital market
ﬁnance and bank lending but trade credit increases to allow them to pursue
their projects. As a result trade credit can smooth out the impact of tighten-
3ing monetary policy. In the ﬁnal section of the paper we test our conjectures
against data from a panel of 16,000 UK maufacturing ﬁrms and conﬁrm that
our model predictions are supported.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
general theoretical model without trade credit. Section 3 brings in the
trade credit and describes the new distribution of ﬁrms over the three credit
sources. Section 4 analyzes the impact of a monetary policy tightening in
both settings. Section 5 provides some empirical evidence that supports the
theoretical predictions of the paper. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The Model without Trade Credit
Consider a two-sector economy with two dates (t =0 ,1).T h eﬁrst sector is
competitive and produces an intermediate input. Firms in this sector are not
ﬁnancially constrained. In the second sector there is a continuum of ﬁrms
(indexed by i)t h a tp r o d u c eaﬁnal good using the intermediate input. These
ﬁrms have an initial endowment of wealth, Wi (measured in ﬁnal good units)
that diﬀers across ﬁrms. Both types of producers are risk-neutral and only
consume at t =1 .A tt =0 , ﬁnal good producers are also endowed with the
following risky technology. They can us eo n eu n i to ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d
that, at t =1 , will yield either H units of the ﬁnal good with probability
α or L (<H ) units with probability 1 − α. Alternatively, ﬁrms can invest
their initial endowment in the market and earn the riskless gross interest
rate R (> 1). The market for the intermediate good is competitive and all
producers charge a price of P units of the ﬁn a lg o o d .T h eﬁnal goodproducers
are ﬁnancially constrained. We assume that Wi is uniformly distributed on
the interval (0,P).
In the absence of capital market imperfections ﬁrms in the ﬁnal good
sector can borrow funds in the capital market at the riskless interest rate.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 : αH +( 1− α)L − PR>0
Assumption 1 states that the project is socially eﬃcient. Therefore, all
ﬁrms irrespective of their level of wealth would earn positive proﬁts. However,
due to costly veriﬁcation of realized returns, ﬁrms have access to diﬀerent
sources of external funding.
4In this section we introduce only two lenders: capital markets and banks.
The diﬀerence between the two relates to the extent each of them can verify
the project returns in each state. Chant (1992) has established that debtor
control is less eﬀective in market ﬁnance because of dispersion of investors
and of free-rider problems. Also banks usually have better information about
their debtors. For simplicity, we assume that capital markets can not verify
the projects’ realized returns, while banks can but only by incurring a cost.
It is clear then that only ﬁrms whose total repayment (principal plus
interest payment) is less than the payoﬀ in the low state can have access to
the capital market. All other ﬁrms have to borrow from banks. In other
words, if R(P − Wi) ≤ L ﬁrms can repay their loans even if their realized
return is equal to L (riskless loans). These ﬁrms can borrow from the capital
market at the riskless gross interest rate R. On the contrary, when the total
repayment exceeds the payoﬀ in the bad state [R(P − Wi) ≥ L] ﬁrms can
only choose bank loans.
2.1 The banks
The banking sector is competitive. Since banks can verify the projects’ real-
ized returns they can oﬀer loans to ﬁrms even when the repayment exceeds
the return in the low state. Townsend (1979) has demonstrated that the
optimal deterministic contract with commitment in this type of environment
is the standard debt contract. Let Mi denote the loan repayment in state
H that banks demand from a borrower with initial wealth Wi and RBi the
corresponding gross interest rate. Then, RBi(P −Wi)=( 1−α)L+αMi.T h e
optimal contract speciﬁes that at t =1 ,i ft h es t a t ei sH, borrowers repay
Mi to the bank and if the state is L the banks verify and take the whole
return. Let V denote the total veriﬁcation costs. We assume that these costs
increase with the size of the loan1: V = m(P −Wi)2,w h e r em is a constant.
Competition in the banking sector implies that banks make zero proﬁts:
πB = RBi(P − Wi) − (1 − α)m(P − Wi)
2 − R(P − Wi)=0 (1)
where R(P − Wi) denotes the opportunity cost of funds.
1According to this functional form, veriﬁcation costs increase at an increasing rate with
loan size. As we will show below this implies that the interest rates that banks charge are
also increasing with loan size. Had we assumed a linear function, the interest rate would
have been independent on loan size.
5From the expression of the banks’ proﬁts we can derive the gross interest
rate charged per loan.
RBi = R +( 1− α)m(P − Wi) (2)
Equation (2) shows that diﬀerent ﬁrms pay diﬀerent interest rates. The
lower the wealth level the higher the interest rate charged. Thus at a certain
level of wealth the verifying costs become so high that the ﬁrm is not willing
to pay the corresponding interest rate.
2.2 The ﬁrms
At t =0 , ﬁrms decide whether to run their projects and earn either H or L
(with probability α and 1−α, respectively) at the end of the period or rather
place their wealth on the market at the riskless interest rate R. Assumption
1 guarantees that ﬁrms that can borrow from the capital market do run their
projects. In what follows, we consider only the ﬁrms that need to borrow
from banks. In order to run their projects they borrow from banks (P −Wi)
and pay an interest rate RBi on their loan2. Their proﬁt function is given
by:
πf = αH +( 1− α)L − RBi(P − Wi) (3)
Firms are proﬁt maximizers. Therefore, they will choose to run the
project if the net returns are higher than the amount they would get from in-
vesting their wealth on the capital market. This condition can be formalized
as follows:
αH +( 1− α)L − RBi(P − Wi) ≥ WiR (4)
We can state now the main result of this section.




¢2,t h e r ee x i s t
two cutoﬀ values W and W0, W>W 0 such that borrowing from the capital
2This is another way to say that at the end of the period ﬁrms pay back L in the bad
state and M in the good state.
6market is not possible for ﬁr m sw i t hw e a l t hl e v e l sW<W and ﬁrms with
wealth less than W0 prefer not to run their projects; they invest in other
ﬁrms’ projects through the capital market. Firms with intermediate wealth
levels borrow from banks.
Proof. Access to capital market requires R(P − Wi) ≤ L. This implies
that Wi ≥ P − L
R. Therefore, the cutoﬀ value above which ﬁrms can borrow
from the capital market is




The rest of the ﬁrms can only borrow from banks. Condition (4) implies that
Wi(RBi−R)+αH +(1−α)L−PRBi ≥ 0. Substituting in the expression of
RBi given by (2) we get
(1 − α)m(P − Wi)
2 + PR− αH − (1 − α)L ≤ 0
Denote by W0 the value of Wi for which the inequality binds. Simple algebraic
calculations give the solution
W0 = P −
s
αH +( 1− α)L − PR
(1 − α)m
(6)
The inequality at the beginning of the proposition ensures that W>W 0.I t
states that, at the cutoﬀ value between market and bank ﬁnance, net returns
in the absence of capital market imperfections are bigger than verifying costs.
It assures that at least in the close vicinity of W there are ﬁr m st h a tt a k e
bank loans.
Proposition 1 states that W0 is smaller than W.W ea l s ow a n tt om a k e
sure that W0 is positive. This implies
P>
s
αH +( 1− α)L − PR
(1 − α)m
(7)
Proposition 1 shows that the initial wealth level is critical when choosing
between the two available sources of external ﬁnance. Firms with high levels
7of wealth (W>W) prefer market funding, those with intermediate wealth
levels (W0 <W<W) turn to bank funding, whilst lower wealth ﬁrms (W<
W0) decide not to invest in their projects. The result directly corresponds to
Proposition 1 in Repullo and Suarez (2000), although our model diﬀers from
theirs.
3 The Model with Trade Credit
In addition to borrowing from ﬁnancial institutions, ﬁrms may obtain loans
from their suppliers. Trade credit represents an important source of external
ﬁnance for ﬁrms. Despite its unattractiveness in terms of costs3, ﬁrms do
request this kind of credit, expressing their willingness to pay high interest
rates for the use of short term ﬁnancing. Moreover, it seems that ﬁrms use
more trade credit when money is tight.
Several empirical studies have investigated how credit terms vary across
industries. There have been found wide variations across industries but
rather similar credit terms within industries. “We ﬁnd little willingness to
vary [TC] terms in lieu of product price changes or in response to a change
in prevailing interest rates trade credit terms are stable over time” (Ng,
Smith and Smith, 1999). “Within industries, the relationship between the
two trading partners determines how strictly the credit terms are enforced.
T h ei m p l i c a t i o ni st h a to n c eas u p p l i e rd e c i d e st oe x t e n dt r a d ec r e d i th ew i l l
continue to do so as a matter of policy” (Nielsen, 2002).
3.1 The seller
There exists a suﬃciently large number of sellers in the market. Sellers
are proﬁt maximizers. They have enough wealth to produce the single good
traded in the economy. The per unit cost of the intermediate good, measured
in ﬁnal good units, is equal to C.A tt =0 , ﬁrms approach the sellers and
ask for the good; the sellers invest C and produce the good instantly. Since
C<P , sellers earn a proﬁto f(P − C) per unit sold.
Sellers can observe the realized returns of their customers’ projects with-
out incurring any cost. They have better information about their customers
than banks do. This advantage arises from the fact that sellers and buyers
3An indicator of the high cost of trade credit is the lost earnings of ﬁrms that do not
use the early payment discounts.
8a r em o s t l ye n g a g e di nt h es a m en o n - ﬁnancial transactions. In such a case,
sellers could decide to oﬀer trade credit to ﬁrms in order to earn ﬁnancial
proﬁts. Non-discrimination among buyers requires that all ﬁrms, irrespective
of their level of wealth, pay the same interest rate for the trade credit oﬀered
by the seller. Therefore, sellers will charge the same interest rate to all their
customers taking trade credit. Let RT denote the interest rate charged by
the trade creditor.
Note that because sellers can observe their customers’ payoﬀst h ef o r mo f
the ﬁnancial contract is indeterminate. Then, without any loss of generality,
we assume that the contract is the standard debt contract.4 If state L occurs
the seller appropriates everything at zero cost; if state H occurs, the seller
demands a repayment MTi that satisﬁes the following condition:
RT(P − Wi)=αMTi+( 1− α)L (8)
Then, at t =0 ,s e l l e r so ﬀer trade credit. They will receive Wi and oﬀer
one unit of the intermediate good. Therefore, the size of the loan will be
(P −Wi). The interest rate that the seller charges, RT,d e ﬁnes a cutoﬀ level
of wealth, ˆ W, such that all ﬁrms with Wi > ˆ W, prefer to approach the banks.
The ﬁrm with initial wealth ˆ W is indiﬀerent between taking a bank loan or
trade credit. Therefore,
RT = RB( ˆ W)=R +( 1− α)m(P − ˆ W) (9)
where RB( ˆ W) denotes the interest rate that the bank would charge to a
borrower with initial wealth ˆ W.
Evidently ˆ W has to be higher than W0. Suppose that the seller chooses
W0 by setting RT = RB(W0).T h eo n l yﬁr m st h a tc o u l dt a k et r a d ec r e d i ta r e
these ﬁrms with initial wealth W0, who are indiﬀerent between bank loans
and trade credit. Wealthier ﬁrms get better conditions from banks while
poorer ﬁrms do not ﬁnd bank loans attractive. As a consequence, in order
for the trade creditor to be able to sell the good to other ﬁrms with wealth
levels lower than W0 the seller has to charge an interest rate lower than
RB(W0).
4This allows comparisons between the terms of bank loans and those of trade credit
contracts.
9From (9) we see that the more the seller moves the cutoﬀ level, ˆ W, further
away from W0 (by oﬀering a lower interest rate, RT) the demand for trade
credit increases. In fact, the demand increases for two reasons. Some of
the ﬁrms that are eligible for loans from banks prefer trade credit and some
of the ﬁrms that could not receive loans at all can nevertheless aﬀord trade
credit. Then, the interest rate RT deﬁnes another cutoﬀ value, W1, such that
all ﬁrms with initial wealth levels in (W1, ˆ W) receive trade credit. The cutoﬀ
value W1 must satisfy the following condition:
αH +( 1− α)L − RT(P − W1)=W1R (10)
Proposition 2 In the presence of trade credit, there exist three cutoﬀ values
W, ˆ W and W1, W>ˆ W>W 1 that diﬀerentiate among ﬁrms with respect
to their source of external funding. Thus, ﬁr m sw i t hh i g hl e v e l so fw e a l t h
(W ≥ W) borrow from the capital market, ﬁrms with wealth levels in the
interval ( ˆ W,W) borrow from banks, ﬁr m sw i t hl e v e l so fw e a l t hi n(W1, ˆ W),
accept trade credit, and ﬁrms with levels of wealth Wi <W 1 do not run their
projects and invest in the capital market.
Proof. Proposition 1 shows that, in the model without trade credit,
ﬁrms with wealth levels Wi > W obtain market funding, while ﬁrms with
wealth levels inside the interval (W0,W) take bank loans. With ˆ W>W 0 we
have to show that ﬁrms with wealth levels in (W0, ˆ W) switch to trade credit.
Since the interest rate these ﬁrms have to pay for accepting trade credit is
RT = RB( ˆ W), which is smaller than the interest rate the bank would charge
them, they are better oﬀ switching to trade credit. The ﬁrm with the lowest
level of wealth among those accepting trade credit earns as much by running
the project as from investing its wealth in the capital market. Using (10) we
ﬁnd that
W1 = P −
αH +( 1− α)L − PR
RT − R
(11)
Therefore, the seller maximizes proﬁts on the interval W1− ˆ W.I nc h o o s -
i n gt h et w oc u t o ﬀ levels, the seller considers the extra proﬁts earned from
oﬀering trade credit. Then, the seller’s extra proﬁts are given by ½
RT (P − Wi)+RWi − PR
RT (P − Wi)+RWi − CR for ﬁrms with
½
W0 <W i < ˆ W
W1 <W i <W 0
10Note that the opportunity cost is diﬀerent between the two intervals. The
ﬁrst group of ﬁrms can borrow from banks, albeit at higher interest rates,
and buy the good even in the absence of trade credit. Therefore, the seller
by oﬀering trade credit makes only an additional ﬁnancial proﬁt. For the
second group of ﬁrms, the seller earns even higher proﬁts. Without trade
credit these ﬁrms cannot purchase the good. Oﬀering trade credit the seller
manages to sell the good to more ﬁrms. Therefore, the lower the interest
rate the sellers charge the higher the demand for the intermediate good. The
above intuition leads to the following result:
Proposition 3 In equilibrium all ﬁrms that do not have access to bank loans
receive trade credit, W1 =0 . The equilibrium trade credit interest rate satis-
ﬁes the following condition: P =
αH+(1−α)L−PR
RT−R .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Up to this point, for simplicity we have assumed a uniform wealth dis-
tribution. This is why all ﬁrms have access to trade credit as sellers are
better oﬀ holding receivables in their balance sheets and extending trade
credit rather than making a higher ﬁnancial proﬁt by keeping interest rates
high and selling to a smaller number of ﬁrms. Had we assumed a normal
distribution, then some ﬁrms would not have had access to trade credit as
the gains from lowering the interest rate (thus increasing the number of ﬁrms
buying the intermediate good) might not be suﬃcient to compensate for the
ﬁnancial losses. Nevertheless, the general taxonomy of ﬁrms according to
their source of funds is very robust to changes in the wealth distribution.
4M o n e t a r y P o l i c y
In this section, we consider the monetary policy implications of trade credit
in our model. We examine the eﬀects of an increase in the rate of inter-
est (tighter monetary policy) on the taxonomy of ﬁrms according to their
ﬁnancial source.
4.1 No Trade Credit
We start the analysis by considering the simple model with only bank and
market ﬁnance. Allowing for a monetary policy tightening, we observe that
an increase in the riskless interest rate R will impact on the level of the other
11interest rates in the economy5.B o t h c u t o ﬀ values that deﬁne the intervals
for market and bank borrowing shift to the right. Let W
0
0 and ¯ W
0 denote the
new cutoﬀs.
Proposition 4 In an economy without trade credit, an increase in the mar-
ket interest rate R increases both the threshold wealth level above which capital
market ﬁnancing is available and the threshold wealth level above which ﬁrms
take bank loans. Fewer ﬁrms are eligible for market ﬁnance, and as a result




W0 (P −Wi)dWi >
R W
0
W (P − Wi)dWi.






Equation (6) deﬁnes the cutoﬀ value below which bank loans are accepted.









(1 − α)m[αH +( 1− α)L − PR]
> 0
Total lending is decreasing because fewer ﬁrms borrow and run their projects.
If the total amount previously borrowed by these ﬁrms (that no longer
have access to bank loans) is greater than the amount borrowed by the new
bank debtors (those that previously had access to the capital market), then
bank lending will decrease. This proves the last part of the proposition.
Our model predicts that a monetary tightening reduces market ﬁnance
and may also reduce bank lending if the outﬂows to unfunded ﬁrms are
greater than the inﬂows from previously market funded ﬁrms.6 Similar results
are obtained by Repullo and Suarez (2000).
5Where a tightening of monetary policy results in an increase of the riskless interest
rate.
6T h er e a s o nf o rt h el a s tq u a l i ﬁcation is that the result depends on (a) the new cutoﬀ
values, and (b) the distribution of wealth. In the proposition the densities are absent from
the intervals because they cancel out (uniform distribution).
124.2 Trade credit
We now do the same kind of exercise including trade credit among the sources
of external ﬁnance. In this case, all ﬁrms could obtain external ﬁnance and
run their projects. A monetary tightening will change the taxonomy of ﬁrms
according to their sources of external ﬁnance but leave total investment un-
changed. Let ˆ W
0 denote the new cutoﬀ.
Proposition 5 An increase in the market interest rate R increases both the
threshold wealth level above which capital market is available and the threshold
wealth level above which ﬁrms take bank loans. As a result, market lending
goes down; bank lending also goes down if
R ˆ W
0




as before. In addition, trade credit increases since ﬁrms that cannot obtain
bank ﬁnance will resort to trade credit following the arguments of Section 3.
Proof. According to Proposition (3) market lending decreases. Since the
cutoﬀ level above which ﬁrms take bank loans increases (∂ ˆ W
∂R = 1
(1−α)m > 0)
if the amount borrowed by ﬁrms that switch to trade credit exceeds the the
amount borrowed by ﬁrms that can no longer access the capital market then
bank lending will also decrease.
As for trade credit, there are ﬁrms that abandon banks and turn to their
suppliers for funding. On the other side of the cutoﬀ all ﬁrms still take trade
credit. (∂W1
∂R = ∂W1
∂ ˆ W ∗ ∂ ˆ W
∂R < 0). Sellers earn most of their extra proﬁts exactly
from selling to the poorest ﬁrms. The interest rate they charge will always
be such as to make the last ﬁrm indiﬀerent between running its project and
investing its wealth in the capital market.
The cutoﬀ values are deﬁn e da sf u n c t i o n so ft h ec o s to ff u n d si nt h e
corresponding markets. Thus, the threshold level of wealth above which
market ﬁnance is available is positively correlated with the riskless interest
rate level. Therefore, an increase in R will shift W to the right. At the
same time, the threshold wealth level above which ﬁrms take bank loans
increases. This is consistent with the credit channel view: an increase in the
costs of external ﬁnance produces a ﬂight to quality, i.e. there is a ranking
of ﬁrms according to quality that ensures that the best customers obtain
market ﬁnance, the middle ranked ﬁrms obtain bank credit and the lowest
quality customers obtain trade credit.
134.3 Predictions
Our model predicts that when there is no trade credit, market ﬁnance will
decline and bank lending may also decline if the outﬂow of unfunded ﬁrms is
greater than the inﬂow of formerly market-ﬁnanced ﬁrms. In such a setting
a monetary contraction will diminish bank lending and the relative amount
of market ﬁnance.
When there is trade credit we obtain a diﬀerent prediction. Market ﬁ-
nance will decline and bank lending may also decline if the outﬂow of ﬁrms is
greater than the inﬂow of formerly market-ﬁnanced ﬁrms, as before, but ﬁrms
that were previously unfunded may now obtain trade credit. Our model pre-
dicts that as bank lending is withdrawn from certain ﬁrms with low wealth,
trade credit will take its place. Hence, in contrast to the model of Repullo
and Suarez (2000), we take into account the fact that ﬁrms that used to
obtain bank funding before the monetary tightening may continue to obtain
funding through trade credit.
The implications of introducing trade credit are:
1) that the absolute level of trade credit taken up should increase in a
period of monetary tightening as more ﬁrms ﬁnd that their wealth level is
insuﬃcient to obtain bank lending.
If the net inﬂow from market ﬁn a n c ei sl e s st h a nt h eo u t ﬂow i.e. bank
lending declines, then we also predict:
2) that the absolute level of bank lending may also decline as the number
of ﬁrms with wealth levels suﬃciently high to allow them to obtain market
ﬁnance falls but by less that the number of ﬁrms that fail to obtain bank
lending at all.
3) that the magnitudes of trade credit relative to total liabilities should
increase while bank lending relative to total liabilities should decline in pe-
riods of tight monetary policy relative to looser periods;
4) that trade credit relative to bank lending should increase.
If the ﬁrms that face ﬁnancial constraints arep r e d o m i n a n t l ys m a l lﬁrms
(because small ﬁr m sh a v ei n s u ﬃcient wealth to reach the threshold for market
or bank ﬁnance) then we should also observe
5) that smaller ﬁrms are aﬀected more dramatically than large ﬁrms by a
monetary tightening. That is during periods when monetary policy tightens,
small ﬁrms’ access to bank lending as opposed to trade credit should decline
and therefore the ratios of trade credit to total liabilities or bank lending
should increase. These eﬀects should not be observed for ﬁrms that are
14larger (and therefore ﬁnancially more healthy) because they should be able
to meet the required thresholds even during tight monetary policy periods.
The next section examines the evidence from a panel of 16,000 manufac-
turing ﬁrms in the United Kingdom over the period 1990-1999.
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section we report empirical results that support the theoretical predic-
tions of our model. To test the implications of the model we use a sub-sample
of the FAME database, which covers all UK registered companies. This gives
detailed balance sheet and ﬁnancial information for about 1.3 million com-
panies plus summarised information for a further 1 million companies. We
construct a sample from the FAME data b a s et h a ta l l o w su st oa n a l y s es o m e
aspects of the monetary transmission mechanism and to emphasise the role
played by ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position. The sample includes data about all active
British companies that satisfy the following criteria:
- their main activity is in the manufacturing sector, according to 1992
UK SIC Code
- they were established prior to 1989 and have information up to 1999 or
2000.
In addition we separate data for the period 1990-1992 when monetary pol-
icy was tightening, from data for the period 1993-1999 when it was loosening.
This provides us with some initial information on manufacturing ﬁrms’ ac-
cess to market ﬁnance, bank lending and trade credit which can address some
of the predictions that were made in the previous section. We average the
data so that the reported ﬁgures are given in millions of pounds per annum
i nT a b l e1 .T a k i n gy e a ra v e r a g e sh e l p st or e m o v et h ed i s t o r t i o n st h a ta r i s e
from the arbitrary allocation of contracts between adjacent ﬁnancial years.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
First we ﬁnd that the absolute level of trade credit taken up by manufacturing
ﬁrms on average per year for the period of monetary tightening is higher than
the same measure for periods of loosening monetary policy. This is given in
column 2 of Table 1, where the ratio for the two periods is greater than
unity. Second, and in contrast, average bank lending in each period shows
the opposite. Bank lending was higher in the looser monetary period than
15in the tighter period, and this is shown by the ratio which is less than one.
Thus the data conﬁrm our ﬁrst and second predictions.
Trade debit (trade credit oﬀered) was lower in the tighter monetary pe-
riod than subsequently, but the comparison between trade credit and trade
d e b i t( w h i c hi sn e tt r a d ec r e d i tr e p o r t e di nt h eﬁnal column) suggests that
this was because manufacturing ﬁrms were oﬀering more credit (not necessar-
ily to other manufacturing ﬁrms) than they were receiving during the loose
monetary policy period.
I nT a b l e2w ec o m p a r et h er a t i o s .I nc olumn 1 we report the ratio between
trade credit and bank lending, which almost halved when we compare the
average per annum ratio for 1993-99 with 1990-92. This suggests that trade
credit relative to bank lending was some 1.82 times higher in the tight period
of monetary policy. Comparing the extent of trade credit to the sum of trade
credit and bank lending we ﬁnd a similar eﬀect, although the magnitude
is lower. The ﬁnal two columns report the ratio of trade credit to total
liabilities and the ratio of bank lending to total liabilities. In both cases the
ratios behave as predicted since trade credit to total liabilities is much higher
in the tight money period than subsequently, while for bank lending to total
liabilities the ratio is lower. This conﬁrms our third and fourth prediction.
5.2 Estimation Results
We estimate the relationship between the ﬁnancial choices of ﬁrms and their
speciﬁc characteristics using a standard panel model written in the following
form:
yit = αi + Xitβ + eit
where i = 1,2,., N refers to a cross section unit (ﬁrms in this study),
t = 1,2,..,T refers to time period. yit and Xit are the dependent variable
and the vector of non-stochastic explanatory variables for ﬁrm i and year t,
respectively. eit is the error term, αi captures ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects. We use
ar a n d o me ﬀects approach, which treats αi as a ﬁrm-speciﬁcd i s t u r b a n c e .
The nature of the data, which is drawn from a large population, makes the
random eﬀects model the most suitable approach for estimation, because it is
more likely that ﬁrm speciﬁc constant terms are distributed randomly across
cross-sectional units, that is, there is no correlation between ﬁrm speciﬁc
constant terms and explanatory variables .
More speciﬁcally we can write the random eﬀects model as follows:
yit = Xitβ + εit, εit = αi + eit
16where εit, the disturbance term, is made up of αi representing an individ-
ual disturbance which is ﬁxed over time and assumed to be uncorrected with
explanatory variables and eit, an idiosyncratic disturbance. The estimation
process involves unbalanced panel data techniques to test our hypothesis.
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of panel estimations of the eﬀects of tight
money on ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes to test prediction 5. We use two measures
of the monetary stance: the level of base rates and the sum of the changes to
t h eb a s er a t eo v e rt h ey e a r-t h u sap o s i t i v es i g ni m p l i e si n c r e a s i n gt i g h t n e s s ,
while a negative sign indicates loosening. However, we report only results
for the level base rates. Similar results are obtained when the monetary
policy tightness is measured by the cumulated sum of the change to the
oﬃcial interest rate during the year and are available at request. The years
1990-1992 were years of tightening, while 1993-1999 were years of loosening
for the UK. The coeﬃcients report the response of ﬁrms according to their
size measured in two diﬀerent ways. In Table 4 we report the results for
ﬁrms classiﬁed by the oﬃcial deﬁnition due to the Department of Trade and
Industry based on the criteria indicated in Table 3, while in Table 5 we classify
the ﬁrms by asset size to correspond to our theoretical prediction that their
wealth is insuﬃcient for them to qualify for ﬁnancing of a given type. The
use of the two diﬀerent measures never alters the sign of the coeﬃcients and
only alters the signiﬁcance in two cases out of 24 pairs of results.
The rows of each panel in the tables report the responses under tight
and loose periods of monetary policy as deﬁned above for ﬁrms of diﬀerent
sizes, altough the model takes into account other explanatory factors in the
response of ﬁrms such as solvency, credit rating, coverage ratio, age, and sales
to ensure that we report the marginal eﬀect of monetary policy conditions
and not the response (by proxy) for something else. In order to remove
demand side eﬀe c t sw eu s er a t i o so fo n et y p eo fﬁnance relative to another
(see Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993). We discuss the Tables panel by panel
below.
In panel 1 we ﬁnd that trade credit increases relative to total short term
debt (the sum of trade credit and bank lending) for all ﬁrm types in periods
of tight monetary policy, and declines in loose periods. The responses are all
signiﬁcant, except for small ﬁrms in the loose money period, when the decline
in response to loosening monetary policy is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. The scale of the response is almost four times greater for small ﬁrms
than for large ﬁrms in Table 4 and three and a half times larger in Table 5.
Medium and large ﬁrms have responses that are much closer in scale in Table
174 and 5. For a loosening policy, the response of small ﬁrms is insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (lower interest rates do not induce an immediate reduction
i nt r a d ec r e d i tt a k e nu pb ys m a l lﬁrms), but for medium and large ﬁrms they
experience an identical decline in the ratio of a modest scale.
Panel 2 shows that trade credit relative to total liabilities also increases
signiﬁcantly with similar responses to panel 1 although the scale diﬀerences
b e t w e e ns m a l la n dm e d i u m / l a r g eﬁrms are not so great. Again the response
of medium and large ﬁrms is very similar, and the response of small ﬁrms to
a loosening policy is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The response in bank lending is muchm o r ed r a m a t i c . P a n e l3s h o w sa
decline in the ratio of bank lending to total liabilities for small ﬁrms ﬁfteen
times greater than for large ﬁrms and seven and a half times greater than
medium sized ﬁrms when interest rates rise. When interest rates fall, the
increase in bank lending is also smaller for small ﬁrms than for medium and
large ﬁrms. This provides compelling evidence for a bank lending channel
that diﬀerentially and adversely aﬀects small manufacturing ﬁrms.
These results support our ﬁfth prediction and conﬁrm that UK manufac-
turing ﬁrms, but especially the small ﬁrms with few assets, resort to trade
credit when monetary policy tightens. The prediction of our model is upheld
after we have conditioned for other factors that might explain the response
to a change in monetary conditions such as solvency, age, credit rating, sales
a n dd e m a n df a c t o r s .
In our model we cannot deﬁne exactly what the cutoﬀ values for the
critical wealth levels might be when we attempt to determine access to sources
of ﬁnance of diﬀerent types. The signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the responses of
small ﬁrms compared to medium and large ﬁrms to a tightening of monetary
policy do suggest, however, that the cutoﬀ for bank lending occurs somewhere
between the size of small ﬁrms (less than 1.4 million pounds) and medium-
sized ﬁrms (less than 5.6 million pounds). Small ﬁrms experience far less
bank lending and more trade credit in tight periods of monetary policy than
medium and large ﬁrms. This is veriﬁed using pairwise Chi-squared tests
of coeﬃcient equality in Table 6. In all of the cases coeﬃcients equality is
rejected for small ﬁrms and large ﬁrms, and the same is true for small and
medium sized ﬁrms with one exception. This exception relates to the bank
lending ratio to total liabilities, where equality of the coeﬃcients cannot be
rejected, which is support for the argument that medium sized ﬁrms face
an equivalent reduction in bank lending when interest rates increase. In
two cases we conﬁrm that the trade credit ratios for large and medium sized
18ﬁrms are identical. This evidence conﬁrms that the responses are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent for small ﬁrms, where test statistics are very large, when compared
to medium and large ﬁrms.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper analyzes the channel of monetary policy transmission when trade
credit is included among the sources of external ﬁnance. Imperfections in the
credit market allow only a few ﬁrms to borrow from the capital market at low
(risk-free) interest rate. Banks cannot observe ﬁrms’ returns costlessly and,
therefore, charge their clients higher interest rates proportional to the amount
that they lend. Since sellers have an information advantage over banks, they
may have incentives to ameliorate credit conditions for borrowers and at the
same time increase their proﬁts. The credit market equilibrium in our model
is characterized by high wealth ﬁrms borrowing from the capital market,
intermediate wealth level ﬁrms borrowing from banks, and low wealth level
ﬁrms taking trade credit. In this framework, we examine the consequences
of a monetary policy change. We predict that a monetary tightening causes
three main results: (a) a decrease in market ﬁnance and bank lending, if
the outﬂows of ﬁrms seeking funds at the lower end of the wealth spectrum
exceeds the inﬂows from the upper end; (b) an increase in trade credit as
some ﬁrms are excluded from bank ﬁnance; and (c) a ﬂight-to-quality eﬀect
for both capital market and bank borrowers. The results are consistent with
the existing empirical literature that has identiﬁed a wider use of trade credit
over periods of monetary tightening.
When we examine the evidence using panel data from 16,000 manufactur-
ing ﬁrms in the UK we ﬁnd that all our predictions are upheld. Bank lending
declines in absolute and relative terms and trade credit increases. When we
separate small ﬁrms from medium and large ﬁrms, and compare the responses
over tight and loose monetary policy we ﬁnd that it is the small (ﬁnancially
weaker ﬁrms) that are excluded from bank lending and these ﬁr m sr e s o r tt o
t r a d ec r e d i t .T h i si st h ec a s ee v e nw h e nw et a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h ee ﬀects of
solvency, age, credit rating, sales and demand side eﬀects. The magnitudes of
the responses of small ﬁrms are many multiples of the responses of medium
and large ﬁrms, which show practically identical responses. This suggests
that the cutoﬀ for bank lending (when asset levels are used to proxy ﬁrm
size) occurs somewhere between the small and medium ﬁrm size.
19The model can be extended in a number of ways. First, for simplicity, in
our model sellers have enough wealth to produce goods, and as long as their
level of wealth is suﬃciently high they can always borrow from the capital
market, banks or other ﬁrms. Further extensions to the theoretical model
could investigate the possibility that some ﬁr m sm a yn o te v e nb ea b l et o
receive trade credit and will simply fail. The eﬀect of a monetary policy
tightening on trade credit would then depend on the inﬂow of new demands
for trade credit and the outﬂow of ﬁr m st h a ts i m p l yﬁle for bankruptcy, in
m u c ht h es a m ew a ya st h ee ﬀect of tightening on bank lending in this paper
depends on the relative inﬂows and outﬂows of previously market ﬁnanced
and trade credit ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
Second, the model suggests that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms that are
excluded from market ﬁnance and bank lending can still receive credit from
other ﬁrms. This implies that the inﬂuence of a given increase in interest
r a t e ss h o u l dh a v eam o r em u t e de ﬀect than if there is no alternative to bank
ﬁnance. The existence of a substitute for bank lending weakens the inﬂuence
of the credit channel to some degree, although trade credit is more expensive
and is typically only held for the short term. If this is so, we should ﬁnd that
real responses to monetary tightening in investment and output are weaker
than otherwise. Alternatively, we may ﬁnd that monetary tightening must
be more severe than otherwise in order to have the desired real eﬀects. These
are empirical issues that could be identiﬁed in the data.
20References
[1] Atanasova, C.V. and Wilson, N. ’Borrowing constraints and the demand
for trade credit: evidence from UK panel data’, Leeds University Busi-
ness School, mimeo 2002
[2] Besanko, D. and G. Kanatas - ’Credit market equilibrium with bank
monitoring and moral hazard’, Review of Financial Studies 6, 213-232,
1993
[3] Bolton, P. and X. Freixas - ’Equity, bonds, and bank debt: capital struc-
ture and ﬁnancial market equilibrium under asymmetric information’,
Journal of Political Economy 108, 324-351, 2000
[4] Biais, B. and C. Gollier - ’Trade credit and credit rationing’, Review of
Financial Studies,v o l .1 0 ,n o .4 ,1 9 9 7
[5] Chant, J.’The New Theory of Financial Intermediation.’ in K. Dowd
a n dM .K .L e w i s( E d i t o r s )Current Issues in Financial and Monetary
Economics. Basingstoke, Hampshire. Macmillan Education Ltd. pp. 42-
65, 1992.
[6] Cunat, V. -’Trade credit: suppliers as debt collectors and insurance
providers’, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics
Mimeo,2 0 0 1
[7] Diamond, D.- ’Monitoring and reputation: the choice between bank
loans and directly placed debt’, Journal of Political Economy 99, 689-
721, 1991
[8] Elliehausen, G. and J. Wolken ’An empirical invetigation into motives
for demand for trade credit’, Federal Reserve Board Staﬀ Study No 165.
[9] Ferris, J. - ’A transactions theory of credit use’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics vol. 96, pp. 243 - 270, 1981
[10] Gertler, M. - ’Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an
overview’, J o u r n a lo fM o n e y ,C r e d i ta n dB a n k i n g20, 559-588, 1988.
[11] Gertler, M. and S. Gilchrist - ’Monetary policy, business cycles, and
the behaviour of small manufacturing ﬁrms’, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 109 (2), pp. 309-340, 1994
21[12] Holmstrom B. and J. Tirole - ’Financial intermediation, loanable funds
and the real sector’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663-691, 1997
[13] Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap and D. Scharfstein - ’The choice between public
and private debt: an analysis of post-regulation corporate ﬁnancing in
Japan’, NBER Working Paper No. 4421, 1993
[14] Hubbard, R.- ’Is there a ‘credit channel’ for monetary policy?’, Federal
R e s e r v eB a n ko fS t .L o u i sR e v i e w63-77, 1995
[15] Jain, N. - ’Monitoring costs and trade credit’, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics and Finance, vol. 41, pp. 89-110, 2001
[16] Kashyap, A. and J. Stein - ’Monetary policy and bank lending’, in
N. Mankiw (ed.) Monetary Policy, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1994
[17] Kashyap, A., J. Stein and D. Wilcox - ’Monetary policy and credit con-
ditions: evidence from the composition of external ﬁnance’, American
Economic Review, vol. 83, 1993
[18] Kohler, M., E. Britton and T. Yates - ’Trade credit and the monetary
transmission mechanism’, Bank of England Discussion Paper,2 0 0 0
[19] Meltzer, A. H. - ’Mercantile credit, monetary policy, and the size of
ﬁrms’, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 42, pp. 429-437, 1960
[20] Ng, C. K., J. K. Smith and R.L. Smith - ’Evidence on the determinants
of credit terms used in interﬁrm trade’, Journal of Finance vol. 54, no.
3, pp. 1109-29, 1999
[21] Nielsen, J. - ’Trade credit and the bank lending channel’, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking,v o l .3 4 ,n o . 1 ,2 0 0 2
[22] Oliner, S. and G. Rudebush - ’Is there a broad credit channel for mon-
etary policy?’, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,1 9 9 6
[23] Rajan, R. and L. Zingales - ’What do we know about capital structure?
some evidence from international data’, Journal of Finance,v o l .5 0 ,p p .
1421-1460, 1995
22[24] Repullo, R. and J. Suarez - ’Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank
monitoring: A model of the credit channel’, European Economic Review
vol. 44, 2000
[25] Schwartz, R.A. -’ An economic model of trade credit’, Journal of Eco-
nomic and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 9, pp. 643-657, 1974
[26] Townsend, R. - ’Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly
state veriﬁcation’, Journal of Economic Theory, 21, pp. 265-295, 1979.
23Appendix







W0[RT (P − Wi)+RWi − PR]dWi
+
R W0




s.t. W1 ≥ 0 (12)




(RT − R)(P − Wi)dWi +
Z W0
W1
(P − C)RdWi + λW1 (13)
where λ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier. We take the derivative with
respect to ˆ W,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a tb o t hRT and W1 are functions of ˆ W.
The ﬁrst order condition is then
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There are two distinct cases: (1) λ =0 ,W 1 > 0,( 2 )λ > 0,W 1 =0 .
1) In the ﬁrst case the ﬁrst-order condition becomes
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Using equations (9) and (11) and taking into account that ∂W1
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24Let X =( 1− α)m(P − ˆ W)2 and A = αH +( 1− α)L − PR.E q u a t i o n
(18) becomes
X + A




3X2 + A ∗ [A +2( P − C)R]=0
Since A>0 and X>0 we have a corner solution because the ﬁrst order
condition is always positive for W1 > 0.
2) In the second case, we have λ > 0,W 1 =0 .S o l v i n g t h e ﬁrst order
condition we get the expression of λ. W1 =0implies
P −
αH +( 1− α)L − PR
RT − R
=0 .
Therefore, αH +( 1− α)L = PR T. Using equation (9) we get
ˆ W = P −
αH +( 1− α)L − PR
(1 − α)mP
(17)
The condition that W0 be positive guarantees that ˆ W is greater than W0.





implies that ˆ W is lower than ¯ W.
25Table 1
Scale of Trade Credit and Bank Lending 1990-1999, UK Manufacturing Firms
(£ millions per annum)
years average trade average bank average trade net trade
credit (TC) lending (BL) debt (TD) credit (NTC)
(1) 1990-92 79.9 75.6 87.5 7.63
(2) 1993-99 67.1 114.7 93.6 26.7
Ratio (1)/(2) 1.19 0.66 0.93 0.29
Table 2
Ratios of Trade Credit to Bank Lending 1990-1999, UK Manufacturing Firms
Years TC/BL TC/(TC+BL) TC/Liabilities BL/Liabilities
(1) 1990-92 1.06 0.51 0.25 0.24
(2) 1993-99 0.58 0.37 0.16 0.28
Ratio (1)/(2) 1.82 1.38 1.56 0.86
Table 3
Size categories ﬁrms
(two out of three criteria should be satisﬁed)
Years Small Medium
Turnover max $ 2.8 mil max $ 11.2 mil
Balance sheet max $ 1.4 mil max $ 5.6 mil
Ratio (1)/(2) max 50 max 250
Source: DTI
26Table 4
Response of Trade Credit Ratios to a Monetary Policy
Tightening (1990-1992) versus Loosening (1993-1999)
according to Size (DTI deﬁnition)
monetary stance small medium large
Ratio: Trade Credit / (TradeCredit + BankLoans)
Tight 0.0371*** 0.0127*** 0.0092***
(0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Loose -0.0018 -.0063*** -0.0067***
(0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Ratio: Trade Credit /Total Liabilities
Tight 0.0314*** 0.0153*** 0.0.143***
(0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Loose -0.0009 -0.0026*** -0.0011***
(0.0018) (0.001) (0.0008)
Ratio: Bank Lending/ Total Liabilities
Tight -0.0245*** -0.0033*** 0.0016***
(0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Loose 0.0032* 0.0056*** 0.0079***
(0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0012)
27Table 5
Response of Trade Credit Ratios to a Monetary Policy
Tightening (1990-1992) versus Loosening (1993-1999)
a c c o r d i n gt oS i z e( d e ﬁnition based on assets only)
monetary stance small medium large
Ratio: Trade Credit / (TradeCredit + BankLoans)
Tight 0.0347*** 0.0164*** 0.0101***
(0.0018) (0.001) (0.0007)
Loose -0.001 -.0079*** -0.008***
(0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Ratio: Trade Credit /Total Liabilities
Tight 0.0304*** 0.017*** 0.0146***
(0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0005)
Loose -0.0023 -0.0025** -0.002***
(0.0019) (0.001) (0.0007)
Ratio: Bank Lending/ Total Liabilities
Tight -0.0226*** -0.007*** 0.0012***
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Loose 0.002 0.0066*** 0.0089***
(0.0019) (0.0012) (0.001)
28Table 6
Chi-square test of Equality of Coeﬃcients
(DTI deﬁnition)
monetary stance small vs large small vs medium medium vs large
Ratio: Trade Credit / (TradeCredit + BankLoans)
Tight 362.42 248.69 14.08
0.0000 0.000 0.0009
Loose 77.64 28.96 4.27
0.0000 0.0000 0.1182
Ratio: Trade Credit /Total Liabilities
Tight 368.50 169.61 2.74
0.0000 0.0000 0.2546
Loose 154.58 15.28 60.21
0.000 0.0005 0.0000
Ratio: Bank Lending/ Total Liabilities
Tight 476.12 290.70 65.01
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Loose 8.32 2.19 12.41
0.0156 0.3345 0.0020
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